Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name:  Jens Leth Hougaard
Author-Name-First: Jens Leth
Author-Name-Last: Hougaard
Author-Email: jlh@ifro.ku.dk
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen
Author-Name:  Kurt Nielsen
Author-Name-First: Kurt
Author-Name-Last: Nielsen
Author-Email: kun@ifro.ku.dk
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen
Author-Name:  Athanasios Papakonstantinou
Author-Name-First:  Athanasios 
Author-Name-Last: Papakonstantinou
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen
Title:  A Multi-attribute Yardstick Auction without Prior Scoring
Abstract: We analyze a two-attribute procurement auction that uses yardstick competition to settle prices. The submitted sealed bids are replaced by yardstick bids, computed by a linear weighting of the other participants’ bids. The auction simplifies the procurement process by reducing the principal’s articulation of preferences to simply choosing the most preferred offer as if it was a market with posted prices. We show that there is only one type of Nash equilibria where some agents may win the auction by submitting a zero price bid. Using a simulation study we demonstrate that following this type of equilibrium behavior often leads to winner’s curse. The simulations show that in auctions with more than 12 participants the chance of facing winner’s curse is around 95%. Truthful reporting, on the other hand, does not constitute a Nash equilibrium but it is ex post individually rational. Using a simulation study we demonstrate that truthful bidding may indeed represent some kind of focal point.
Length: 16 pages
Creation-Date: 2013-05
Revision-Date: 2014-03
File-URL: http://okonomi.foi.dk/workingpapers/MSAPpdf/MSAP2013/MSAP_WP02_2013_revised.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
Number: 02_2013
Keywords: Multi-attribute auction, yardstick competition, articulation of preferences, simulation
Handle: RePEc:foi:msapwp:02_2013